Reliability analysis of multiplex control system of subsea blowout preventer based on stochastic Petri net by Zengkai Liu et al.
Z. Liu i dr.                                    Analiza pouzdanosti višestrukog upravljačkog sustava za sprečavanje podmorske erupcije bušotine temeljenog na stohastičkoj Petri mreži 
Tehnički vjesnik 24, 1(2017), 7-14                                                                                                                                                                                                                     7 
ISSN 1330-3651 (Print), ISSN 1848-6339 (Online)  
DOI: 10.17559/TV-20130502140334  
 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLEX CONTROL SYSTEM OF SUBSEA BLOWOUT 
PREVENTER BASED ON STOCHASTIC PETRI NET 
 
Zengkai Liu, Yonghong Liu, Baoping Cai, Ju Li, Xiaojie Tian 
 
Original scientific paper  
The multiplex (MUX) control system of subsea blowout preventer (BOP) plays a vital role in providing safe working conditions for the subsea drilling 
activities. According to the working states and critical failure modes of the MUX control system, this paper presents its stochastic Petri nets (SPN) model, 
taking into account the imperfect fault detection capacity. The numerical analysis method is proposed based on the isomorphic continuous-time Markov 
chain of the model. The reliability indexes, namely reliability, availability and MTTF of the MUX control system and pilot hydraulic control system are 
obtained and compared. In addition, the effects of fault coverage factor on state probabilities and availability of the MUX control system are researched 
and the uncertainty analysis of the firing rates related to MTTF is also performed. 
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Analiza pouzdanosti višestrukog upravljačkog sustava za sprečavanje podmorske erupcije bušotine temeljenog na 
stohastičkoj Petri mreži 
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Višestruki (MUX − multiplex) upravljački sustav za sprečavanje podmorske erupcije bušotine (BOP − blowout preventer) ima bitnu ulogu u stvaranju 
sigurnih radnih uvjeta kod podmorskih aktivnosti bušenja. U skladu s radnim stanjima i kritičnim načinima kvara višestrukog upravljačkog sustava, u radu 
se predstavlja njegov stohastički model Petri mreža (SPN), uzimajući u obzir nesavršenu sposobnost otkrivanja greške. Predlaže se metoda numeričke 
analize temeljena na istolikom (izomorfnom) trajnom Markovljevom lancu modela. Istraživani su i uspoređivani pokazatelji pouzdanosti, odnosno 
pouzdanost, raspoloživost i MTTF višestrukog (MUX) upravljačkog sustava i probnog hidrauličkog upravljačkog sustava. Uz to, istraživani su učinci 
faktora prikrivenosti grešaka na vjerojatnosti stanja i dostupnost MUX upravljačkog sustava, a izvršena je i analiza nesigurnosti brzina paljenja u odnosu 
na MTTF.  
 
Ključne riječi: dostupnost; pouzdanost; sprečavatelj podmorske erupcije bušotine; stohastičke Petri mreže; višestruki upravljački sustav  
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
A blowout preventer (BOP) is a device that allows 
the well to be sealed to confine the well fluids in the 
wellbore [1]. Subsea BOPs are supposed to deal with 
extreme erratic pressures and uncontrolled flow coming 
from a well reservoir during subsea drilling activities, 
which are critical to the safety of crew, rig and ocean 
environment. On April 20, 2010, a well control incident 
resulted in explosions and a fire on Deepwater Horizon 
rig. Eleven people lost their lives and many people were 
injured in this tragedy. Besides, massive offshore oil spilt 
into the Gulf of Mexico and it is the worst ecological 
disaster in US history. One important reason of the well 
blowout was that the BOPs could not function [2]. 
Therefore, high reliability of the BOPs is very important. 
A typical subsea BOP stack is made up of four ram 
BOPs, two annular BOPs, a hydraulically operated 
wellhead connector, a hydraulically operated lower 
marine riser connector, and lots of choke and kill valves. 
BOP control systems operate equipment used to control 
pressure during well control operations. A single 
operation such as opening a kill valve or closing a ram is 
called a "function". Functions are controlled by hydraulic 
signals that operate valves. At present, there are two kinds 
of BOP control systems, pilot hydraulic (PH) control 
system and multiplex (MUX) control system [3]. The 
control system for a subsea BOP stack is required to be 
designed to deliver power fluid at sufficient volume and 
pressure to operate selected functions within allowable 
response times. For example, the control system shall 
have a closing response time not exceeding 45 seconds 
[1]. For deepwater drilling activities, PH control system 
cannot be used because the BOP closing times will not 
satisfy the closing time requirements. Since electronically 
coded commands travel faster through conductive cables 
than hydraulic signals do through hose bundles, a MUX 
control system is used for deepwater drilling. 
In response to practical needs, some researchers have 
done many studies in reliability analysis of the subsea 
BOP control system. The Markov and Bayesian models 
for the electrical control system of the subsea BOP system 
are proposed in the view of hardware structure and the 
performance of triple modular redundancy system and 
double dual modular redundancy system are compared [4, 
5]. Deepwater BOP reliability and well kick data in the 
US Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf region are 
collected and the fault trees of the BOP system are 
presented [6, 7, 8]. However, fault trees method belongs 
to static analysis beyond the capability of describing the 
dynamic characteristics of the system, which does not 
consider the system state changes over time or the impact 
of fault sequence on the reliability of the system. In 
addition, it is unable to describe the repair acts after the 
failures of the system [9, 10]. 
Petri net (PN) is a powerful tool for reliability 
models, consisting of places, transitions and directed arcs 
[11]. PNs are suitable for modeling and analyzing systems 
with parallelization, synchronization and confliction [12]. 
They are convenient for qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the system and easily extended. Stochastic 
Petri net (SPN) is defined as a timed PN whose transition 
firing periods are exponentially distributed random 
variables [13]. The variable means that an enabled 
transition can be fired after an exponentially distributed 
time delay. SPN has been widely used in the reliability 
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analysis of the systems in various fields. Kleyner and 
Volovoi [14] presented an application of SPN to calculate 
the availability of safety critical on-demand systems and 
the model is illustrated with a case study of an automotive 
electronics airbag controller. Zhong et al. [15] established 
a SPN model of China Urban Emergency Response 
System and the performance analysis is performed based 
on the isomorphic Markov chain. Tuysuz and Kahraman 
[16] present a method for modeling and analysis of time 
critical, dynamic and complex systems using SPN with 
fuzzy sets and a numerical example is given to show the 
applicability of proposed approach. Lei et al [17] studied 
the performance of wireless opportunistic schedulers in 
multiuser systems based on the presented SPN models 
and performance of both opportunistic and non-
opportunistic schedulers are compared in terms of average 
queue length, mean throughput, average delay and 
dropping probability. Marsan et al. [18] used generalized 
SPNs for the performance analysis of asynchronous 
transfer mode local area networks that adopt the available 
bit rate service category. Li et al. [19] presented the 
generalized SPNs modular modeling method to reveal the 
influence on system performance by the logistic model of 
reconfigurable manufacturing system.  
This paper presents a SPN model of the MUX control 
system of subsea BOP, based on the working states and 
failure modes. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 introduces the MUX control system. In 
Section 3, the SPN model is developed and analyzed. 
Section 4 covers the analytical results and discussions. 
Section 5 summarizes the paper. 
 
2 System description 
 
According to the failure position, a subsea BOP 
system is divided into eight subsystems, namely, annular 
preventer, connector, flexible joint, ram preventer, choke 
& kill valve, choke & kill lines, MUX/PH control system 
and dummy items [8]. As shown in Fig. 1, a subsea MUX 
control system is mainly made up of central control unit 
(CCU), driller’s panel, toolpusher’s panel, MUX cable 
reel, hydraulic power unit (HPU), accumulators and two 
control pods [20]. 
The driller's and tool pusher's panels display 
illuminated push buttons to control or monitor functions. 
The CCU connects the panels with the MUX cable reel. It 
contains the central processing units, application 
programs, and other components that control 
communications and functions between the surface and 
the pods. MUX cable reels carrying an armored cable 
provide power and communications paths from the CCU 
to each subsea pod. HPU and accumulators are used to 
provide hydraulic power for controlling the BOP stack. 
For PH control system, the CCU is replaced by the 
hydraulically controlled manifold valves. Hydraulic 
umbilical cables are used to carry pilot signals and power 
fluid to the pods [21].  
Control pod is the core of the MUX control system, 
which serves as the subsea control valve manifold and 
contains all of the pressure regulators and control valves 
required to operate the subsea functions. For high 
reliability, two control pods are mounted on the lower 
riser package on the BOP stack. Each pod can operate all 
subsea functions, but only one pod is active at the same 
time and the other pod is hot standby. The system will be 
retrieved to the surface for repair in case of any major 
problem associated with one pod. When a major problem 
is found in the active pod, the other pod will control the 
subsea BOP and preparations will be made to retrieve the 
lower marine riser package and riser to surface.   
 
Driller's panel Central Control Unit Toolpusher's panel
MUX cabel reel Surface accumulators
HPU
ReservoirRedundant 











Figure 1 Schematic of a MUX control system 
 
The control panels initiated the demand on the subsea 
control system. The demand signal is multiplexed down 
the umbilical to the subsea pod, where the signal is 
decoded and performed. For example, to close a BOP 
ram, the demand signal will be sent to the subsea control 
pod and decoded. The decoded signal will open a solenoid 
electrically and therefore, the proper hydraulic valve will 
receive a hydraulic pilot signal. This pilot signal will 
cause the hydraulic valve to shift and send stored and 
pressurized hydraulic fluid to the BOP ram to be closed. 
 
3 Modelling and analysis 
3.1 Stochastic Petri nets 
 
SPN has become a graphical and mathematical 
modeling tool for analysis of the static and dynamic 
systems. Its transition firing time is exponentially 
distributed random variables, which means that an 
enabled transition can fire after an exponentially 
distributed time delay [13]. A SPN is a 6-tuple [11], 
)( 0 λ,W,M,F,T,PSPN = .  
(1) )( 321 mP,...,P,P,PP = is a finite set of places 
(drawn as circles).  
(2) )( 321 qT,...,T,T,TP =  is a finite set of transitions 
(drawn as rectangles).  
(3) )()( PTTPF ×∪×⊆ is a set of arcs. An arc 
connects a transition to a place or a place to a transition 
with a directed arrow.  
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(4) }{ 002010 kM,...,M,MM = is the initial marking, 
with .∅≠∪∅=∩ TP,TP  
(5) ...} ,2 ,1 ,0{→W  is a weight function.  
(6) }{ 21 l,...,, λλλλ = is the set of firing rates 
associated with the transitions. 
A transition can be enabled if the tokens in its input 
places are more than the requirements marked on the 
input arcs. When an enabled transition is fired, 
appropriate tokens are removed from the input places to 
the output places at the end of the firing time. Due to the 
memoryless property of exponential distribution of firing 
delays, each transition has a constant firing rate. 
 
3.2 System modelling 
 
The subsea BOP system may fail when it is located 
on the rig. And during running the BOP or pulling it out 
of the water, it may also fail. In the above phases, the 
BOP is not acting as a well barrier. These failures are not 
safety-critical. However, most of the failures occur when 
the subsea BOP stack is on the wellhead, which might 
cause well kicks or blowout. Therefore, the failures of the 
subsea BOP system on the wellhead are regarded as 
safety critical failures in terms of well control [8]. In this 
paper, only the critical failures are considered to develop 
the model. For MUX control system, its critical failure 
modes includes "loss of all functions both pods", "loss of 
all functions one pod", "loss of one function both pods", 
"loss of all functions one pod", "loss of several functions 
one pod" and unknown failures. When the MUX control 
system fails, it will be pulled out of the water and 
repaired. Before the repaired system returns to normal 
operation on the wellhead, an install test is necessary. 
After the success of an install test, the drilling activities 
can start again. During the period of normal operation, 
scheduled tests including pressure tests and function tests 
are also needed in order to ensure the high reliability. The 
scheduled pressure test is performed every seven days. In 
addition, failures may occur during the install tests or 
scheduled tests. Therefore, when the subsea BOP is on the 
wellhead, it is in normal operation or being tested or 
failed and waiting for repair.  
In most cases about system reliability modeling, one 
important assumption is that all the failures can be 
detected. That is to say that the fault coverage factor is 
100 %. However, the practical fault diagnosis capacity is 
not perfect and influenced by the diagnostic system, 
human factor, environmental factor et al [22]. Some 
failures may not be detected, so the practical fault 
coverage factor is less than 100 %. The detected failures 
can be repaired immediately. But, the undetected failures 
will be found during the scheduled tests and then repaired. 
Based on the working states and critical failure modes, the 
SPN model with imperfect fault coverage of MUX control 
system of the subsea BOP is presented in Fig. 2. Except 
for "Loss of all functions both pods" failure, PH control 
system has the same failure modes with MUX control 
system. Therefore, the SPN model of PH control system 
can be represented by removing place P0 and transition 
T01 in Fig. 2. In addition, some firing rates of transitions 
are different and the values will be given later. 
The meanings of places in the model are as follows. 
P0: the MUX control system is in normal operation; P1: 
the system is failed and the failure is detected; P2: the 
system is failed but the failure is undetected. P3: the 
system is repaired and performing an install test; P4: the 
system is performing a scheduled test.  
The meanings of the transitions are as follows. T1: 
detected failure "loss of all functions both pods" occurs; 
T2: detected failure "loss of all functions one pod" occurs; 
T3: detected failure "loss of one function both pods" 
occurs; T4: detected failure "loss of one function one 
pod" occurs; T5: detected failure "loss of several 
functions one pod" occurs; T6: detected unknown failure 
occurs; T7: undetected failures occur; T8: repair the failed 
system with undetected failures; T9: detected failures 
occur during the install test; T10: repair the failed system 
with detected failures; T11: undetected failures occur 
during the install test; T12: the scheduled test is finished; 
T13: starts a scheduled test; T14: detected failures occur 
during the scheduled test; T15: undetected failures occur 
during the scheduled test;T16: the install test is finished. 
 
 
Figure 2 SPN model of the MUX control system of subsea BOP 
 
3.3 Quantitative analysis of the model 
 
In this section, the method to perform numerical 
analysis is proposed. It has been proved that a SPN model 
is isomorphic to a continuous time Markov chain 
(CTMC) due to the memoryless property of the 
exponentially distributed delays [23]. The CTMC can be 
obtained according to the reachable marking set of the 
SPN model. Then, performance analysis of the system is 
performed based on the CTMC.  
In the SPN model, the initial marking is M0 = 
(1,0,0,0,0) and the reachable marking sets of all activation 
are as follows: M0 = (1,0,0,0,0), M1 = (0,1,0,0,0), M2 = 
(0,0,1,0,0), M3 = (0,0,0,1,0), M4 = (0,0,0,0,1).The 
average activation rates of T1, T2, T3, …, T16 are 
1λ , 2λ , 3λ ,…, 16λ respectively. The CTMC is obtained as 
shown in Fig. 3. 
The transition matrix of CTMC is obtained in Eq. (1). 
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where, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 131q λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + + + + , 
1 2 3 4 5 62q λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + + , 9 11 163q λ λ λ= + + ,
12 14 154q λ λ λ= + + . Pi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is defined as the 
steady-state probability of state Mi. The state probabilities 
expression is as follows: 
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Figure 3 CTMC of the SPN model  
 
Pi(t) is the transient probability of state Mi at time t. It 
can be calculated by solving Eq. (3). The initial 
conditions are 0 (0) 1P = , 1 (0) 0P = , 2 (0) 0P = , 3 (0) 0P = , 
and 4 (0) 0P = . 
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Availability is defined as the probability that the 
system is operating at an instant of time or over a given 
time interval. The equation for transient availability is  
 
( ) Pr[ ( ) 1]A t X t= =                                                      (4) 
 
where ( ) 1X t =  means that the services are available. The 






=                                                               (5) 
Reliability is referred to the probability that a system 
can perform its required functions under stated conditions 
during the period [0, t]. Mathematically, it is expressed as 
follows， 
 
( ) Pr{ } ( )
t
R t T t f x dx
∞
= > = ∫                                         (6) 
 
where )(xf is the failure probability density function and 
T  is the continuous random variable of correct operation 
time. One point to note is that the reliability of the system 
is not related to repairs, so the transition arcs related to 
repairs after failures have to be omitted to calculate the 
reliability. With the steady-state and transient 
probabilities of each state, the reliability and availability 
can be computed. 
Mean time to failure (MTTF) is an important 
reliability index for the system. The specific steps for 
calculation are as follows [24]: 
 (1) )](,),(),([)( 410 tPtPtPtP ⋅⋅⋅=  denotes the possible 
state of the system at time t. The initial condition is P(0) = 
1,0,0,0,0,0 and it means that the system is in normal 
operation. The system will fail when it enters into state 
1M , 2M  or 3M , which are defined as the absorbing 
states. Deleting the related elements of the absorbing 
states in matrix Q, the QR can be obtained: 
 
13
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0 5[ (0), (0)] [0, 1]RP P Q = −                                            (8) 
 
(3) Finally, the equation to compute MTTF is   
 
* *
0 5(0) (0)MTTF P P= +                                                (9) 
 
Based on Reference [8], probability values about 
failures, tests and repairs are collected. In normal 
operation period, the failure rates of "loss of all functions 
both pods", "loss of all functions one pod", "loss of one 
function both pods", "loss of one function one pod", "loss 
of several functions one pod" and unknown failures are 
denoted by 1 'λ , 2 'λ , 3 'λ , 4 'λ , 5 'λ and 6 'λ respectively. 
Their values are λ1'= 3,8080e−6, λ2'= 3,0464e−5, λ3'= 
1,5232e−5, λ4'= 2,2848e−5, λ5'= 3,8080e−6 and λ6'= 
3,0464e−5. The failure rate during the scheduled tests and 
install tests is λscheduled = 2,4907e−5 and λinstall = 1,9372e−5 
respectively. Here, the fault coverage factor c is assumed 
to be 95 %. According to the property of exponential 
distribution, 1/λij is the mean time of the system going 
from state Mi into state Mj [23]. All the firing rates of 
transitions for MUX control system and PH control 
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Table 1 Values of the firing rates of transitions 
Component MUX ( 1−h ) PH( 1−h ) Description 
1λ  3,6176e−6 - '1λc  
2λ  2,8940e−5 9,6216e−5 '2λc  
3λ  1,4470e−5 1,9243e−5 '3λc  
4λ  2,1705e−5 2,8865e−5 '4λc  
5λ  3,6176e−6 1,9243e−5 '5λc  
6λ  2,8940e−5 1,9243e−5 '6λc  
7λ  5,3311e−6 5,0640e−6 )'''''')(1( 654321 λλλλλλ +++++− c  
8λ  5,7550e−3 7,0572e−3 reciprocal of mean time to repair the undetected failures 
9λ  7,7488e−6 7,7488e−6 installc λ)1( −  
10λ  1,1142e−2 1,7331e−2 reciprocal of mean time to repair the detected failures 
11λ  1,1623e−5 1,1623e−5 installcλ  
12λ  7,6570e−2 7,6570e−2 mean lasting time for a scheduled test 
13λ  5,9524e−3 5,9524e−3 reciprocal of mean scheduled test cycle 
14λ  1,4944e−5 1,4944e−5 scheduledcλ  
15λ  9,9628e−6 9,9628e−6 scheduledc λ)1( −  
16λ  7,6570e−2 7,6570e−2 mean lasting time for an install test 
 
4 Results and discussions 
 
According to Eq. (2), the steady-state probability of 
each state, the steady-state availability and MTTF of 
MUX and PH control system are listed in Tab. 2. 
Compared with PH control system, MUX control system 
has a little lower steady-state availability and MTTF. 
However, it is important that MUX control system is used 
in deeper water and the working environment is harsher 
and more complicated. 
The transient probability of each state for the MUX 
control system can be calculated by solving Eq. (3). 
Transient availability and reliability of the MUX control 
system and PH control system is shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 
5 respectively. Fig. 4 shows that availability of the two 
kinds of control systems decreases quickly and will reach 
stable values in the first hundreds of hours. PH control 
system has a little higher stable availability than the MUX 
control system, which is in accordance with the steady-
state analysis results in Tab. 2. Fig. 5 shows that PH 
control system has a little higher reliability than MUX 
control system.  
 
   
Figure 4 Transient availability of MUX and PH control system    
 
 
Table 2 Steady-state probability values and MTTF for MUX and PH 
control systems 
Component MUX PH 
0P  0,9180 0,9213 
1P  8,4991e−3 5,2137e−3 
2P  8,6598e−4 6,7388e−4 
3P  1,3015e−3 1,2419e−3 
4P  7,1340e−2 7,1595e−2 
A  0,9893 0,9928 
MTTF/days 413,6 435,1 
 
 
Figure 5 Transient reliability of MUX and PH control system 
 
The effects of fault coverage factor on the probability 
of each state and availability of the system are researched 
and shown in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6a, the probability of state 
0M  decreases very quickly and it approaches a stable 
value soon. Increasing the fault coverage factor can 
improve the probability of state M0. Fig. 6b shows that the 
probability increases over time and it reaches a stable 
value in about 200 hours when the factor is not 0. When 
the fault coverage factor is 0, the system will never go 
into state M1, because the failures cannot be detected. 
Figs. 6b and 6c show that the effects of fault coverage 
factor on state M1 and M2 are opposite. When the fault 
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coverage factor is 1, the system will never enter into state 
M2, because all the failures can be detected. Fig. 6d shows 
that the fault coverage factor has greater effects on the 
probability of state 3M  in the first 1000 hours. In order to 
make the curves more distinct in Fig. 6e, the initial value 
of x-axis is set as 30. As shown in the figure, the 
probability increases quickly and then decreases until 
reaching a stable value as time passes by. High coverage 
factor can also improve its probability. As shown in Fig. 
6f, availability increases as the fault coverage factor 
increases. The higher diagnostic coverage, the sooner 





Figure 6 Effects of the fault coverage factor on (a) transient probability of state M0, (b) transient probability of state M1, (c) transient probability of state 
M2, (d) transient probability of state M3, (e) transient probability of state M4, (f) availability of MUX control system 
 
Based on Eqs. (7) ÷ (9), MTTF of the MUX control 
system depends on the firing rates 1λ , 2λ , 3λ , 4λ , 5λ , 6λ , 
7λ , 12λ , 13λ , 14λ , 15λ  and is not related to the fault 
coverage factor. For simplicity, the failure rate of the 
system during the normal operation period and scheduled 
tests is denoted by λoperation and λscheduled respectively. The 
expressions are 7
1
 operation iiλ λ== ∑ , 14 15scheduledλ λ λ= + . 
According to Tab. 1, 13λ  is the reciprocal of mean 
scheduled test cycle, which can be used to describe the 
test frequency. Long test cycle means low 13λ and low test 
frequency. 12λ  is the reciprocal of mean lasting time for a 
scheduled test. Therefore, MTTF of the MUX control 
system is affected by the firing rates about failures in 
normal operation period and scheduled tests, the test 
frequency and test lasting time. As the firing rates might 
not be accurate, uncertainty analysis is performed. 
Assuming that the values of λoperation, λscheduled, λ12 and λ13 
are subjected to an uncertainty of ±20 %.  
 
 
Figure 7 Effects of main firing rates on MTTF of MUX control system 
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The upper and lower bounds of MTTF of the system 
are plotted in Fig. 7. It is shown that the failure rates 
during the normal operation have the greatest effects on 
MTTF while the failure rate during the scheduled tests 
period has little effects on MTTF. With decreasing λ12, 
MTTF increases, because the probability of failures is 
lower in state M4 than in state M0. In addition, increasing 




In this paper, a SPN model of the MUX control 
system for the subsea BOP is presented, taking into 
account the imperfect fault coverage. Reliability, 
availability and MTTF are evaluated based on the 
isomorphic CTMC of the model.  
(1) Transient reliability, availability and steady-state 
availability and MTTF of MUX and PH control systems 
have been obtained based on the derived equations. 
(2) Compared with PH control system, MUX control 
system has a little lower reliability, availability and 
MTTF, but it is used in deeper water with more 
complicated working conditions. 
(3) The fault coverage factor has different effects on 
the state probabilities of the MUX control system and 
increasing the value can improve the availability of the 
system. 
(4) MTTF is more easily influenced by the failure 
rates in normal operation period and the failure rate in the 
scheduled tests has the lowest influence. In order to 
improve MTTF, great efforts should be made to reduce 
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